

The Role of the Regional Inspectorate of Supervision in Strengthening Transparent and Accountable Police Governance at the North Sumatra Regional Police

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Abstract

The reform of the Indonesian National Police toward a Professional, Modern, and Trustworthy institution positions internal oversight as the backbone of transparent and accountable governance. The Regional Inspectorate of Supervision (Itwasda) functions as the internal oversight unit at the Regional Police level, yet its effectiveness is frequently questioned because it is embedded within the very structure it is meant to control. This study aims to analyse the role and legal standing of Itwasda in strengthening transparent and accountable police governance within the North Sumatra Regional Police, and to identify the obstacles together with the formulation for its reinforcement. The research employs a normative legal method complemented by an empirical approach, applying statute, conceptual, and case approaches, with legal materials analysed qualitatively and prescriptively. The findings reveal that Itwasda plays a strategic role through audit, review, evaluation, monitoring, and routine inspection that sustain the principles of accountability and openness, although its optimisation is hampered by limited structural independence, sectoral egoism, corps culture, weak follow-up of recommendations, and a shortage of certified auditors. The study recommends strengthening functional independence, synergy with external oversight bodies, digitalising supervision, and cultural reform so that the function of Itwasda evolves from administrative formality into a tangible instrument of public accountability.

Keywords: *Internal Oversight; Itwasda; Accountability; Transparency; Police Governance.*

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Introduction

A rule-of-law state never rests on constitutional declaration alone; it demands that government agencies be subject to law and that mechanisms exist to ensure such subjection genuinely operates. Indonesia affirms its character as a rule-of-law state through Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and the most fundamental consequence of that affirmation is that power must not be exercised without limits and must be accountable [2]. In the context of law enforcement, the Indonesian National Police (Polri) occupies a unique position because it holds both repressive and preventive authority that directly touches the rights of citizens. The history of the formation of Indonesia's criminal law system demonstrates that the authority of law enforcement officials has always been accompanied by the need for controls to prevent it from becoming arbitrary [1].

The discretionary authority inherent in Polri members makes the issue of oversight not merely an administrative matter but one that touches the heart of human-rights protection. Discretion is necessary so that law enforcement is not rigid and can adapt to concrete situations in the field; however, excessively broad subjective judgment creates potential for abuse of authority if it is not accompanied by adequate controls [4]. This is where the relevance of internal police oversight finds its footing, for without functioning controls, discretion may shift from an instrument of justice to a source of violations.

Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police lays the basic framework that Polri is a state instrument that plays a role in maintaining public order and security, enforcing the law, and providing protection, safeguarding, and service to the community [3]. That normative mandate requires Polri to operate professionally and accountably. However, the *das sollen* set out in regulations frequently diverges from the *das sein* on the ground. Public demands for a clean police force align with the spirit of Law No. 28 of 1999 on the Administration of a State that is Clean and Free from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism, which obliges every state administrator to uphold the principles of accountability and openness [6].

The gap between normative expectations and empirical reality is evident from the persistently high volume of public complaints regarding police services and individual officer conduct. Reports received by the National Police Commission and the Ombudsman consistently place alleged abuse of authority, slow case handling, and alleged procedural violations among the dominant categories of complaints year after year. This phenomenon shows that the problem does not lie in the absence of rules but in the weakness of mechanisms that ensure those rules are obeyed and violations thereof are consistently sanctioned. The issue of rights protection confronting state power is in fact a classic theme in the discourse on human rights in Indonesia, which emphasises that every exercise of state authority must be subject to limitations in order to protect the dignity of citizens [5].

To meet the need for control, Polri has constructed a layered supervisory architecture. At the external level there is the National Police Commission, the judiciary, the legislature, and civil-society participation. At the internal level, oversight is carried out by the Professional and Security Division and the Inspectorate of Supervision, which at the Regional Police level is known as the Regional Inspectorate of Supervision or *Itwasda*. The existence of *Itwasda* is regulated by Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police No. 22 of 2010 on the Organisational Structure and Work Procedures at the Regional Police Level, which places it as the supervisory and command-support element in conducting general supervision and inspection [10]. The concept of such internal oversight is not foreign to Indonesia's public institutional governance, as evidenced by supervisory functions attached to various institutions, ranging from oversight of village government administration [8] to oversight of products and services affecting the public interest [9].

The problem is that the effectiveness of internal oversight is perpetually shadowed by the same structural paradox: the supervisor and the supervised share the same institutional roof, operate under the same chain of command, and maintain corps loyalty that is often difficult to separate from objective assessment. The critical question that arises is to what extent *Itwasda*

can exercise its oversight function independently and with real impact, or whether it is in danger of becoming a mere administrative ritual generating piles of recommendations without meaningful follow-up. The context of the North Sumatra Regional Police is particularly worth examining because its jurisdiction is relatively broad and complex, with a high caseload and social dynamics. Various case-resolution practices within the North Sumatra Regional Police, including the application of restorative justice in certain cases, show that policing policy in this region is closely linked to the need for process accountability [7].

This complexity places the internal oversight function under genuine test, for the greater the discretion exercised in the field, the greater the need for credible control. Previous studies on police oversight generally focus on the role of external oversight bodies such as the National Police Commission or discuss ethics enforcement through the Professional and Security Division mechanism, while studies specifically placing Itwasda as the internal oversight unit within the framework of strengthening transparency and accountability at the Regional Police level remain relatively limited. Many legal-institutional studies concentrate on the protection of prisoners' rights, consumer protection, or dispute resolution in other institutions [17], [18], [21], [26], so that scholarly inquiry into internal police oversight at the regional level has not been thoroughly explored. This gap constitutes the research gap this article seeks to fill, by specifically examining the role of the Itwasda of the North Sumatra Regional Police.

From the foregoing, the urgency of this research lies in the need to reassess whether the legal design of internal police oversight adequately supports the ideal of transparent and accountable governance, or whether it still leaves gaps that must be corrected. Based on this background, the research questions posed are:

1. What is the role and legal standing of the Regional Inspectorate of Supervision (Itwasda) in strengthening transparent and accountable police governance within the North Sumatra Regional Police?
2. What factors impede the optimisation of Itwasda's internal oversight function and what is the formulation for its reinforcement.

Literature Review

Theory of the Rule-of-Law State and the Concept of the Rule of Law

The idea of the rule-of-law state is rooted in the conviction that power must be tamed by law so that it does not become tyranny. In the Continental European tradition the concept of *Rechtsstaat* is known, which emphasises fundamental-rights guarantees, separation of powers, governance by statute, and the existence of administrative courts, while the Anglo-Saxon tradition developed the concept of the rule of law, which rests on the supremacy of law, equality before the law, and the protection of rights through judicial decisions. Indonesia has absorbed both traditions and embodied them in its constitution, so that all exercise of state power, including that of the police, must be grounded in legality and be accountable [2].

For police institutions, the concept of the rule-of-law state means that every action, from investigation, inquiry, arrest, to detention, must have a clear legal basis and be subject to prescribed procedures. Without functioning oversight, the principle of legality will remain only a norm on paper. The long journey of forming Indonesia's criminal law demonstrates that limiting the power of law enforcement officials is an integral part of building a fair and humane justice system [1]. The logical consequence of the rule-of-law state is the protection of human rights as the outer limit of state power. Every exercise of police authority must be read within the framework of respect for human dignity, so that oversight of officer conduct is not merely an internal disciplinary matter but an instrument for protecting citizens' rights, as part of a broader commitment to human rights protection [5], [20]. In this context, Itwasda may be understood as one manifestation of the rule-of-law state's commitment, namely ensuring that the power exercised by the police remains within the corridors of law and is held accountable. Furthermore, the rule-of-law state demands a balance between the effectiveness of law enforcement and the guarantee of procedural justice. The discourse of legal reform in Indonesia

demonstrates that reforms to norms and institutions are frequently driven by the need to balance the value of security with the value of justice [15]. Internal police oversight must therefore be understood as part of the rule-of-law architecture that keeps officials from placing themselves above the very law they are supposed to enforce.

Internal Control Theory

Oversight is theoretically understood as a process of monitoring, evaluation, and correction of the implementation of an activity so that it proceeds in accordance with plans, standards, and applicable provisions. In public institutional management, oversight is distinguished into embedded oversight carried out by direct superiors, functional oversight carried out by a specialised unit, and external oversight conducted by parties outside the organisation. Itwasda falls within the category of internal functional oversight because it is carried out by a specialised unit established to supervise the conduct of duties at the Regional Police level [10].

Internal oversight ideally performs both preventive and corrective functions simultaneously. The preventive function consists of monitoring and guidance to prevent deviations from occurring, while the corrective function consists of inspection and recommendations for improvement when deviations are found. This concept of oversight has long been practised in various institutions, both in the context of supervising policy formulation at the lowest level of government [8] and in overseeing products and services with broad societal impact [9], affirming that oversight is an inseparable element of good governance.

The classic problem in internal oversight theory is independence. Internal oversight faces a dilemma because the supervisor and the supervised are within the same organisation, making it susceptible to conflicts of interest and hierarchical pressure. To maintain its credibility, internal oversight must have sufficient room to manoeuvre, adequate access to information, and assurance that oversight results will be followed up without interference. Without these prerequisites, internal oversight readily degenerates into inconsequential formality. Within the police framework, the internal oversight function is also supported by disciplinary and professional-ethics instruments. Government Regulation No. 2 of 2003 on Disciplinary Regulations for Members of the Indonesian National Police provides the foundation for enforcing member discipline [11], while National Police Regulation No. 7 of 2022 on the Professional Code of Ethics and the Professional Code of Ethics Commission of the Indonesian National Police governs the enforcement of professional ethics [12]. Itwasda interacts with these instruments, as oversight findings frequently become the gateway to both disciplinary processes and professional-ethics enforcement.

Theory of Public Accountability

Public accountability is essentially the obligation of an institution or official to explain and account for its actions to the party authorised to assess them, accompanied by consequences for that assessment. Accountability contains three important elements: the obligation to provide information and explanation, the existence of a party entitled to demand accountability, and the possibility of sanctions or correction. Without the element of consequence, accountability merely stops at reporting without any controlling significance. Public accountability may be categorised into several dimensions, including legal accountability demanding compliance with regulations, administrative accountability demanding procedural orderliness, professional accountability demanding adherence to professional standards, and political and social accountability demanding accountability to the community. Itwasda plays a role primarily in the dimensions of legal, administrative, and professional accountability because it examines the compliance of work units with norms, procedures, and performance standards [10].

In the context of public services, police accountability cannot be separated from the mandate of Law No. 25 of 2009 on Public Services, which places the police as a service provider that is obliged to be accountable to the community [14]. Experience in other institutions shows

that accountability for the fulfilment of citizens' rights, such as the right to health and other fundamental rights, is only meaningful when there is a mechanism that monitors and demands accountability in practice, including criminal accountability for actions that harm vulnerable parties [17], [18], [27].

Accountability and oversight are two sides of the same coin. Oversight is the instrument that enables accountability to be enforced, while accountability is the goal that oversight seeks to achieve. If Itwasda exercises its functions effectively, internal police accountability can be maintained; conversely, weak internal oversight will erode accountability and ultimately undermine public trust in the police institution.

The Concept of Good Governance and General Principles of Good Administration

The concept of good governance demands the exercise of public power in a participatory, transparent, accountable, responsive, effective, efficient manner that upholds the rule of law. In the practice of governmental administration in Indonesia, these principles crystallise in the General Principles of Good Administration, such as the principles of legal certainty, orderly administration, openness, proportionality, professionalism, and accountability. These principles serve as the benchmark for assessing whether the actions of a public institution have met the standards of good governance [6].

For the police, good governance is translated into institutional management that is clean, professional, and service-oriented toward the community. Internal oversight through Itwasda is one of the mechanisms that ensures these principles do not remain as slogans but are tested through audit, review, and evaluation of work-unit performance [10]. Accordingly, Itwasda may be understood as the gatekeeper of good governance principles within the regional police environment.

The application of good governance also demands inter-institutional synergy and fair conflict resolution. Experience in industrial relations, for example, shows that resolution models combining various approaches can produce more substantive justice than mere formal procedures [19]. This lesson is relevant to the police, for good internal oversight is not only about imposing sanctions but also about building an organisational culture that upholds integrity and service.

Furthermore, good governance requires adequate human-resource competence. Strengthening competence through the development of knowledge, skills, and attitudes is a prerequisite for an organisation to be able to carry out its functions with excellence [25]. In the context of Itwasda, the availability of competent and certified auditors and inspectors determines whether internal oversight is genuinely of quality or merely satisfies administrative formality.

The Concept of Transparency and Public Information

Openness Transparency is a principle that demands openness of information in the exercise of public power, so that the community can know, follow, and assess the course of governance. In Indonesia, this principle is guaranteed through Law No. 14 of 2008 on Public Information Openness, which places openness as a right of citizens and an obligation of public bodies, including the police [13]. Transparency is a prerequisite for accountability, since accountability can only be assessed if information about performance and policy is accessible.

However, transparency within the police body faces a distinctive tension, namely between openness and operational secrecy. Not all information can be disclosed because some relates to tactics, security, or the protection of personal data. The issue of balancing openness and data protection also arises in other sectors, such as the management of electronic medical records, which demands data protection while also requiring management accountability [16]. Itwasda plays a role in navigating this tension by ensuring that information exemptions are not abused to conceal deviations.

Transparency is also closely related to public trust. A police force that is transparent in handling complaints and taking action against violations will more easily obtain social legitimacy. Experience with restorative-justice case handling in the North Sumatra Regional Police jurisdiction shows that the openness of the process also shapes the sense of justice felt by the parties [7]. Accordingly, strengthening transparency through internal oversight is not merely administrative compliance but an investment in public trust in the police institution.

Research Methodology

This study employs normative legal research complemented by an empirical or socio-juridical approach. The normative legal research track is pursued to examine the norms, principles, and doctrines governing the internal oversight function of the police, while the empirical dimension is introduced to understand how those norms operate in institutional practice within the North Sumatra Regional Police. This combination is chosen because the problem of internal oversight cannot be adequately answered by textual legal analysis alone but also demands a reading of its implementation context.

The approach consists of three mutually complementary approaches. First, the statute approach, which examines the various regulations relating to internal police oversight, from Law No. 2 of 2002 [3], Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police No. 22 of 2010 [10], Government Regulation No. 2 of 2003 [11], to National Police Regulation No. 7 of 2022 [12]. Second, the conceptual approach, which traces the concepts and theories of oversight, accountability, transparency, and good governance to construct an analytical framework. The conceptual approach is commonly used in legal research to analyse the meaning and standing of an institution or norm [24], [28].

Third, the case approach is used selectively to examine case-resolution practices and complaint handling within the North Sumatra Regional Police, including the application of restorative justice as a reflection of process accountability [7], [23]. The case approach is not intended to test the legality of a decision but to understand the empirical context underpinning the need for effective internal oversight.

The sources of legal materials consist of three types. Primary legal materials include the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, statutes, government regulations, and relevant police regulations. Secondary legal materials include books, peer-reviewed academic journals, and previous research discussing oversight, accountability, and public institutional governance. Tertiary legal materials include legal dictionaries and encyclopaedias that assist in interpreting terms. Reliance on indexed journals is the primary basis for ensuring that the arguments constructed have a verifiable scientific foundation [9], [19], [25].

The technique for collecting legal materials is conducted through library research and documentation, namely inventorying, classifying, and examining relevant statutes and literature. The collected legal materials are then systematically arranged according to the research questions to facilitate the analysis stage. To enrich the empirical dimension, this study also examines secondary data in the form of official reports and publications that depict the dynamics of internal police oversight.

The technique for analysing legal materials is conducted qualitatively with a prescriptive character. Legal materials are analysed by interpreting norms, connecting them with concepts and theories, and assessing the consistency between legal ideals and their practice. The interpretive methods employed encompass grammatical, systematic, and teleological interpretation, so that the analysis does not stop at the text of provisions but extends to the purposes the norms are intended to achieve. Ultimately, the analysis is directed toward formulating prescriptions in the form of a reinforcement formula for Itwasda's internal oversight function, as is customary in the tradition of legal research oriented toward reform and improvement of governance [15], [22].

Results

The Role and Legal Standing of Itwasda in Strengthening Transparent and Accountable Police Governance at the North Sumatra Regional Police

The legal standing of Itwasda cannot be understood in isolation from the organisational architecture of the police at the regional level. Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police No. 22 of 2010 on the Organisational Structure and Work Procedures at the Regional Police Level places the Regional Inspectorate of Supervision as the supervisory and command-support element that is subordinate to and responsible to the Regional Police Chief [10]. This position makes Itwasda the eyes and ears of the leadership in ensuring that all work units carry out their duties in accordance with provisions, while simultaneously serving as the internal examiner of the implementation of programmes, budgets, and performance. Functionally, Itwasda conducts supervisory and inspection activities commonly abbreviated as wasrik, encompassing audit, review, evaluation, monitoring, and other supervisory activities. Audit aims to assess compliance and performance, review to ensure reporting quality, evaluation to assess programme achievement, while monitoring oversees the follow-up of findings. This series of activities is theoretically the manifestation of internal functional oversight that is both preventive and corrective in nature, as recognised in the theory of public institutional oversight [8], [9].

Within the framework of public accountability, the role of Itwasda occupies the dimensions of legal, administrative, and professional accountability. Examination of work-unit compliance with statutes enforces legal accountability; examination of administrative orderliness and budget management enforces administrative accountability; while assessment of the quality of duty execution enforces professional accountability. Accordingly, Itwasda serves as one of the nodes that enables the police's obligation to account for its actions to be enforced concretely rather than merely normatively [10], [14].

The role of Itwasda in strengthening transparency is evident from its function of receiving and following up on public complaints. The internal public-complaint channel becomes the entry point for citizens to submit grievances about police officer conduct or service. If these complaints are processed transparently and followed up fairly, institutional transparency will be strengthened and public trust maintained, consistent with the public-information openness mandate that applies to every public body [13]. Conversely, complaints that accumulate without clarity will erode the institution's legitimacy.

In the context of the North Sumatra Regional Police, this role becomes increasingly important given the breadth and complexity of the jurisdiction managed. Case-resolution practices through the restorative-justice approach that have developed in this region demand process accountability so that the discretion exercised by investigators does not deviate from the goals of justice [7]. Itwasda has an interest in ensuring that such discretionary policies are carried out in a measured, documented, and accountable manner, so that restorative justice does not become a loophole for unaccountable practices.

The strengthening of accountability by Itwasda is also intertwined with disciplinary and professional-ethics instruments. When an inspection uncovers suspected violations, the findings can become the gateway for disciplinary proceedings under Government Regulation No. 2 of 2003 [11] as well as professional-ethics enforcement under National Police Regulation No. 7 of 2022 [12]. This interconnection shows that Itwasda does not stand alone but forms part of an ecosystem of supervision and development that mutually supports one another within the police body.

It should be noted, however, that this strategic role will only be meaningful if recommendations produced by oversight are genuinely followed up. Accountability theory teaches that accountability without consequences is defective accountability. The measure of Itwasda's success therefore lies not in the number of findings or recommendations but in the extent to which those findings change organisational behaviour and close gaps for deviations. Experience in other institutions demonstrates that the fulfilment of citizens' rights becomes

meaningful only when oversight is accompanied by genuine enforcement mechanisms [17], [18].

From the perspective of the rule-of-law state, the standing of Itwasda is the embodiment of the principle that power must be controllable. Internal oversight serves as the first safety net before external mechanisms such as the National Police Commission or the judiciary operate. In this position, Itwasda should ideally be able to screen and correct deviations at an early stage, thereby reducing the burden on external oversight. Herein lies the strategic significance of Itwasda in supporting transparent and accountable police governance at the North Sumatra Regional Police, namely as an internal control instrument that should serve as the frontline guardian of institutional integrity [3], [6].

Accordingly, the answer to the first research question can be affirmed: normatively, Itwasda holds a strong standing and role as an internal oversight element supporting the legal, administrative, and professional accountability of the police and serving as the guardian of transparency principles through complaint handling and performance oversight. The question then shifts to the level of effectiveness, namely to what extent that large normative role is genuinely realised in practice, which will be analysed in the following subsection.

Factors Impeding the Optimisation of Itwasda's Internal Oversight Function and the Formulation for Its Reinforcement

The most fundamental impediment to the optimisation of Itwasda's function is structural in nature, residing in the paradox of internal oversight itself. Itwasda is subordinate to and responsible to the Regional Police Chief, while the objects it supervises are work units that also fall within the same chain of command [10]. This configuration places the supervisor and the supervised under the same institutional roof, making the independence of assessment vulnerable to hierarchical pressure and corps interests. Oversight theory has long warned that internal oversight without independence guarantees easily degenerates into mere formality.

The next impediment is cultural in nature, namely the strong corps solidarity or *esprit de corps* that can transform into an obstacle to objectivity. Loyalty to fellow members, while important for organisational cohesion, potentially produces reluctance to take action against violations by unit colleagues. Such culture fosters a tendency to conceal deviations and causes internal oversight to lose its sharpness. The problem of organisational culture impeding rule enforcement has also been observed in other institutions, as seen in the phenomenon of violence and violations that are difficult to sanction in closed environments [29].

The third factor is limited human-resource capacity. Quality oversight demands competent and certified auditors and inspectors who master audit standards, regulations, and inspection techniques. When the number of inspectors is limited and their competence is uneven, the quality of oversight also declines. Strengthening competence through the development of knowledge, skills, and attitudes is a prerequisite for a unit to carry out its functions with excellence [25], making limited human-resource capacity a weakness that must be promptly addressed.

The fourth factor concerns weak follow-up of recommendations. Not infrequently, oversight results stop at reports without meaningful execution, either because of Itwasda's limited executive authority or because of work-unit resistance. Yet, within the accountability framework, recommendations that are not followed up are equivalent to the absence of accountability, since the element of consequence is not fulfilled [14]. This weak follow-up widens the gap between *das sollen* and *das sein*, between the ideal design of oversight on paper and the reality of its implementation.

The fifth factor is limited information openness. Although Law No. 14 of 2008 guarantees the public's right to public information [13], some oversight information is often treated as excepted information on the grounds of internal confidentiality. This tension between openness and confidentiality, as also encountered in the management of sensitive data in other sectors

[16], can be exploited to close public access to oversight results, thereby weakening social control over police performance.

The sixth factor relates to overlapping authority among oversight units. The internal oversight function of the police is not carried out by Itwasda alone but also by the Professional and Security Division, which handles the enforcement of discipline and the code of ethics. The absence of clear boundaries can give rise to duplication or, conversely, oversight gaps in certain areas. Weak coordination among oversight units causes oversight energy to be dissipated and accountability to become blurred.

In the face of these impediments, comprehensive reinforcement formulas are required. First, strengthening the functional independence of Itwasda through guarantees of manoeuvring room, access to information, and protection for inspectors, so that the objectivity of assessments is not disturbed by hierarchical pressure. This functional independence can be supported by a dual reporting mechanism, namely to the regional leadership as well as to the inspectorate at the central level, so as not to be entirely dependent on a single chain of command [10].

Second, strengthening synergy with external oversight bodies and other government internal oversight apparatuses. Collaboration with the National Police Commission, the Ombudsman, and the state financial audit body will strengthen the legitimacy and driving force for follow-up of recommendations. Experience with dispute resolution through combined models demonstrates that synergy among approaches produces more substantive justice [19], and the same logic applies to the synergy of internal oversight with external controls.

Third, enhancing human-resource capacity through continuous education, training, and auditor certification. Investment in inspector competence is the foundation for quality oversight, as it is affirmed that organisational excellence is built on the development of the skills, knowledge, and attitudes of its personnel [25]. Without competent inspectors, however well-designed the oversight architecture, it will not produce sharp findings and implementable recommendations.

Fourth, digitising and making the oversight process transparent. The use of oversight information systems and integration with national complaint channels can accelerate handling, narrow the space for manipulation, and facilitate monitoring of follow-up. Openness regarding oversight results that do not involve operational secrets will strengthen public accountability and public trust, consistent with the spirit of public information openness [13] and clean governance [6].

Fifth, cultural reform that places integrity above misguided corps solidarity. Consistent professional ethics development through the enforcement of the code of ethics [12] and discipline [11] must be accompanied by the creation of an organisational culture that views reporting of deviations as the highest form of loyalty to the institution and the state, not as betrayal of colleagues. Cultural change is certainly the most difficult but precisely the most decisive factor, for without cultural change, improvements to structure and procedure will be short-lived.

Sixth, clarifying the authority boundaries and coordination mechanisms between Itwasda and the Professional and Security Division to prevent overlap as well as gaps in oversight. Clear role demarcation, accompanied by coordination protocols and information exchange, will enable the internal police oversight ecosystem to function in an integrated manner. With such a formulation, Itwasda's function is expected to evolve from merely fulfilling administrative formality into a genuine instrument of accountability that answers the need for transparent and accountable police governance at the North Sumatra Regional Police [3], [5].

Conclusion

The Regional Inspectorate of Supervision normatively holds a strategic standing and role as the internal oversight element at the Regional Police level, supporting legal, administrative, and professional accountability through audit, review, evaluation, monitoring, and complaint-handling activities, while simultaneously maintaining transparency as a prerequisite for public

trust. For this role not to remain at the formal level, police leadership must ensure that every oversight recommendation is followed up consistently and measurably, so that accountability is genuinely accompanied by real consequences.

The optimisation of Itwasda's function at the North Sumatra Regional Police is impeded by limited structural independence, strong corps culture, limited auditor capacity, weak follow-up of recommendations, restricted information openness, and overlapping authority among oversight units. Its reinforcement must therefore be pursued comprehensively through guarantees of functional independence and dual reporting, synergy with external oversight bodies, enhancement of inspector competence and certification, digitalisation of oversight, cultural reform that upholds integrity, and clarification of authority boundaries among units. With these measures, Itwasda is expected to evolve into a credible and impactful oversight instrument rather than a mere administrative formality within the police institution.

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