

The Effectiveness of Propam's Internal Oversight Mechanism in Ensuring Criminal Law Enforcement Accountability Among Members of the Indonesian National Police (A Study at the North Sumatra Regional Police)

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Abstract

Internal oversight of law enforcement institutions is a fundamental pillar of democratic governance. This study examines the effectiveness of the Professional and Security Division (Propam) as an internal oversight mechanism within the Indonesian National Police (Polri), with a particular focus on the North Sumatra Regional Police. The research employs a normative legal methodology, incorporating statute, conceptual, and case-based approaches, with primary legal materials drawn from legislation, police regulations, and court decisions relevant to police disciplinary enforcement. The findings reveal that while the normative framework governing Propam's authority is relatively comprehensive anchored in Law No. 2 of 2002 on Polri and Government Regulation No. 2 of 2003 on Police Discipline its practical implementation faces significant constraints. These include a culture of institutional protectionism, limited independence of oversight panels, inadequate transparency in disciplinary proceedings, and an imbalance between internal and external accountability mechanisms. The study concludes that the current Propam oversight model requires structural reform, including stronger integration with external oversight institutions such as Komnas HAM and Ombudsman RI, as well as a paradigm shift toward human rights-based policing. Recommendations are directed at legislative reform and institutional restructuring to enhance both procedural and substantive accountability within Polri's law enforcement conduct.

Keywords: *Propam; Pengawasan Internal; Akuntabilitas Polri; Penegakan Hukum Pidana; Kepolisian Daerah Sumatera Utara*

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Introduction

The Indonesian National Police (Polri) is a law enforcement institution that occupies a central role in maintaining public order, protecting society, and enforcing criminal law. However, this strategic position simultaneously entails significant responsibility, particularly with respect to the accountability of its members' conduct. Since the reform era, issues of ethical and legal violations by individual members of Polri have continued to attract public and academic scrutiny. Data from the Professional and Security Division (Propam) of Polri indicate that throughout 2022–2023, thousands of disciplinary and ethical violation cases were handled internally; however, their resolution was frequently assessed as lacking in transparency and insufficient in deterrent effect [1].

Amid ongoing demands for police reform, the internal oversight mechanism through Propam should serve as the frontline institution for ensuring institutional accountability. Propam functions as an internal oversight body responsible for addressing disciplinary violations, professional ethics breaches, and even criminal acts committed by Polri members. This authority is governed by Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police and Government Regulation Number 2 of 2003 on the Disciplinary Regulations for Members of the Indonesian National Police [2]. In practice, however, the existing oversight mechanism frequently encounters various structural and cultural impediments that diminish its effectiveness.

Empirical studies reveal a significant gap between *das sollen* and *das sein* in the enforcement of discipline among Polri members. Normatively, existing regulations have conferred sufficient authority upon Propam to conduct preliminary investigations, full investigations, and prosecutions against members who commit violations. Factually, however, Propam's independence remains questionable given that it operates within the same command structure as the units it oversees. This situation creates a potential conflict of interest that tends to result in case resolutions that protect the institution rather than uphold the truth. This phenomenon is further compounded by the marked absence of transparency in disciplinary and professional ethics proceedings, which are conducted internally and remain closed to the public [3].

The North Sumatra Regional Police (Polda Sumut) constitutes a relevant and representative context for examining these issues. Several serious violation cases involving members of Polda Sumut, including instances of torture during interrogation, abuse of authority, and involvement in narcotics networks, have come to public attention and drawn scrutiny from the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM). Reports from the Indonesian Ombudsman have also documented that a number of public complaints concerning the conduct of Polri members in the North Sumatra region were not adequately followed up by the internal oversight mechanism [4]. This reality necessitates a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of Propam as an accountability instrument.

From an academic perspective, prior research on Polri's internal oversight has tended to be descriptive in nature and has not sufficiently addressed the structural dimensions of accountability mechanism failures. Siregar [5] examines police authority in criminal law enforcement but has not specifically analyzed the effectiveness of Propam's internal oversight. Hutagalung and Zarzani [6] investigate the implementation of restorative justice within the Polda Sumut context, but their focus is directed primarily toward case resolution rather than professional oversight mechanisms. Aspan [7] addresses the discretionary authority of law enforcement officials, yet his analysis has not engaged in depth with the internal accountability dimension. This research gap underscores the need for a dedicated study focusing on the effectiveness of Propam from both normative and empirical legal perspectives.

The urgency of this research is further reinforced by the emergence of new regulations strengthening the accountability framework for law enforcement officials, including Law Number 22 of 2022 on Correctional Affairs and various Police Chief Regulations governing professional conduct standards for Polri members. Siregar and Lubis [8], in their study on penal system reform, assert that without effective oversight, legal reform will not produce substantive

change. In a similar vein, Siregar, Adrian, and Rambe [9] note that the conceptual framework of Indonesia's criminal law system requires a more robust accountability mechanism in order to function optimally.

Based on the foregoing background, this study addresses two research questions: (1) How effective is Propam's internal oversight mechanism in ensuring criminal law enforcement accountability among members of Polri at the North Sumatra Regional Police? (2) What structural and normative constraints does Propam face in performing its oversight functions, and how should the oversight mechanism be reformulated to strengthen Polri's accountability?

Literature Review

Theory of Legal Effectiveness

Legal effectiveness is a central concept in legal science, referring to the extent to which legal norms are genuinely observed and implemented within society. Soerjono Soekanto, as cited by Siregar [5], identifies five determinants of legal effectiveness: the legal norm itself, law enforcement officials, facilities and infrastructure, the community, and legal culture. In the context of Propam's oversight function, all five factors are highly relevant and must be analyzed conjointly, since a failure in any one element will affect the effectiveness of the system as a whole.

Friedman, in his theory of the legal system, divides legal components into three elements: substance, structure, and legal culture. This approach provides a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding why law fails to function as intended. In the context of internal police oversight, the legal substance namely, the regulations governing Propam may be adequate; however, a non-independent institutional structure and a protectionist legal culture can obstruct its effectiveness [10]. Tarigan and Aspan [11], in a different context concerning prison overcapacity, similarly found that the ineffectiveness of law frequently originates in structural and cultural factors rather than in the written norm alone.

The thought of Hans Kelsen regarding the validity and effectiveness of law is likewise relevant in this context. Kelsen distinguishes between normative validity (ought) and factual effectiveness (is), and asserts that a legal norm requires minimum effectiveness in order for its validity to be recognized. This means that if Propam consistently fails to perform its oversight function, the norms governing it will, in a sociological sense, lose their binding force [12]. Such a condition not only harms those who are victims of violations, but also undermines the legitimacy of the Polri institution as a whole.

In its development, modern legal effectiveness theory has placed greater emphasis on the responsive law approach, as elaborated by Nonet and Selznick. Responsive law is not merely concerned with formal compliance, but also with adaptation to societal needs and the values of substantive justice. For Propam, this approach requires that the oversight mechanism not simply execute administrative procedures, but genuinely respond to society's demands for justice and accountability in Polri's conduct [13].

Theory of Accountability in Law Enforcement Institutions

Accountability in the context of law enforcement institutions encompasses complex and multi-layered dimensions. According to Bovens, accountability may be differentiated into democratic, legal, administrative, and professional accountability. For the police as an institution possessing coercive authority including the use of firearms and detention legal accountability constitutes the most critical dimension and cannot be set aside [14]. Rahmayanti, Zarzani, Sukarwoto, and Diriyanti [3] emphasize that acts of violence committed by officials within formal institutional settings require robust and transparent accountability mechanisms.

The concept of accountability in modern policing is inseparable from the idea of democratic policing that developed in the post-Cold War era. This principle affirms that the police in a democratic state must be subject to civilian control, through both internal and external mechanisms. In the Indonesian context, Siregar [15] underscores that Polri's accountability

must be strengthened through the synergy between internal oversight bodies (Propam and Irwasum) and external oversight bodies (Kopolnas, Komnas HAM, and the DPR). Without such balance, accountability will remain a mere formality.

Sidi and Zarzani [16], in their study of criminal accountability in cases of sexual violence perpetrated by authority figures, affirm that legal accountability cannot be confined solely to the institution's internal processes. The same principle applies in the context of violations committed by Polri members: when internal mechanisms prove inadequate, external accountability pathways including general judicial proceedings must be able to operate effectively and without interference. This is consistent with the principle of equality before the law, which constitutes the foundation of the rule of law state.

Comparative studies indicate that the most effective model of police oversight is a hybrid model that combines professional internal oversight with independent external oversight. The United Kingdom employs the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), while Australia has the Police Integrity Commission, which operates outside the police command structure. These models offer valuable lessons that the effectiveness of oversight is largely determined by the independence of the oversight body, the transparency of its processes, and its accessibility to aggrieved members of the public [17].

Theory of the Rule of Law and Human Rights

The concept of the rule of law (*rechtsstaat*) embraced by Indonesia, as enshrined in Article 1(3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, positions law as the supreme authority in the exercise of state power. In a rule of law state, no organ of the state including the police stands above the law or is immune from legal accountability. Siregar, in his work on Human Rights in the Indonesian Legal System [15], affirms that the rule of law principle demands effective control mechanisms over every act of state officials that has the potential to violate human rights.

The nexus between policing functions and human rights protection is particularly close in the context of criminal law enforcement. Every action taken by Polri in the processes of preliminary inquiry, investigation, arrest, and detention directly engages the fundamental rights of citizens, such as the right to liberty, the right not to be tortured, and the right to due process of law. Alfiansyah, Nasution, and Zarzani [18], in their study of criminal accountability, emphasize that every act that infringes upon a person's basic rights even when committed by state officials must be met with firm and non-discriminatory law enforcement.

The principle of due process of law, adopted within the Indonesian legal system through the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), requires every stage of criminal law enforcement to be carried out in accordance with established procedures. Deviations from these procedures such as arrest without a warrant, torture during interrogation, or detention beyond the stipulated time limit constitute not merely administrative violations, but also serious human rights violations. Pintabar, Rafianti, and Saragih [19], in the context of fulfilling the rights of correctional inmates, demonstrate that humane treatment standards represent a non-negotiable legal obligation in every context of law enforcement.

From the perspective of international law, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) have long established standards of police conduct grounded in respect for human rights. As a member of the United Nations, Indonesia bears both a moral and legal obligation to integrate these standards into its police regulations and practices. Oversight by Propam should serve as the domestic mechanism ensuring compliance with these international standards [20].

Theory of Discretion and Professionalism of Law Enforcement Officers

Discretion is one of the inherent characteristics of police work that distinguishes it from other legal professions. Aspan [7] defines law enforcement discretion as the freedom to make

decisions in particular situations that are not, or not yet fully, regulated by positive legal norms. This discretion is two-sided in nature: on one hand, it is necessary to enable the police to respond to complex and dynamic situations in the field; on the other hand, without adequate oversight mechanisms, discretion can become an instrument of abuse of authority.

In the Indonesian criminal justice system, police discretion is regulated under Articles 7 and 16 of Law Number 2 of 2002, which authorize investigators to take other measures deemed necessary in urgent circumstances. Nevertheless, this discretionary authority must be exercised within the parameters established by the KUHAP and other applicable legislation [9]. Fitra, Zarzani, Aspan, and Siregar [21] affirm that every legal authority including discretionary power must be counterbalanced with commensurate accountability so as not to become a loophole for the abuse of power.

The professionalism of law enforcement officials constitutes an inseparable prerequisite for the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. In the Polri context, professionalism encompasses technical competence in investigation, moral integrity in decision-making, and commitment to professional ethical values. Rafianti, Zarzani, and Sahlepi [22] underscore the importance of measurable professionalism standards subject to periodic evaluation. Propam's oversight mechanism should ideally function not merely as a sanction-enforcement instrument, but also as a vehicle for the continuous development of professionalism.

The restorative approach in resolving violations by officials, as examined by Fikri, Siregar, and Rafianti [23], offers an alternative perspective worthy of consideration in reforming Propam's mechanism. This approach is oriented not merely toward the imposition of sanctions, but also toward the restoration of trust between the police institution and aggrieved members of the public. Nevertheless, as Hutagalung and Zarzani [6] caution, the application of restorative justice must be conducted selectively and must not be employed as a pretext for evading criminal accountability that would otherwise be warranted.

Research Methodology

This study employs a normative legal research methodology, which positions law as a prescriptive norm or rule rather than an empirical social phenomenon. The selection of this methodology is based on the consideration that the primary object of inquiry is the effectiveness of the legal norms governing Propam's internal oversight mechanism, making the normative approach more appropriate for identifying the gap between norm and reality [24]. Nevertheless, this study also accommodates factual data in the form of findings from oversight institution reports and relevant court decisions, which serve as secondary legal materials that enrich the analysis.

The approaches employed in this study encompass three principal methodologies. First, the statute approach involves analyzing and examining all regulations pertaining to the authority, functions, and operational mechanisms of Polri's Propam, ranging from Law Number 2 of 2002, Government Regulation Number 2 of 2003, Police Regulation Number 7 of 2022 on Professional Ethics and the Professional Ethics Commission of the Indonesian National Police, to Police Chief Regulations governing the technical implementation of internal oversight [2]. This approach is conducted systematically by identifying the hierarchy of norms and the consistency among regulations.

Second, the conceptual approach is employed to analyze relevant legal concepts, including the concepts of legal effectiveness, institutional accountability, law enforcement discretion, and police professionalism. The use of this approach enables the researcher to construct legal arguments grounded in established legal doctrine and theory, thereby producing an analysis of greater scientific rigor [12]. Siregar, Adrian, and Rambe [9], in their study of Indonesia's criminal law system, likewise employ the conceptual approach to build systematic and coherent argumentation.

Third, the case approach is applied selectively to analyze several court decisions and published violation cases involving members of Polda Sumut. This approach facilitates an

examination of how legal norms are applied (or disregarded) in concrete situations, allowing the gap between law in abstracto and law in concreto to be identified with greater precision [25]. Siswanto, Siregar, and Siregar [26], in their analysis of divergent court decisions in narcotics cases, employ a similar approach to identify inconsistencies in the application of law by enforcement officials.

The sources of legal materials in this study are divided into three categories. Primary legal materials consist of the legislative and regulatory instruments identified above, along with various Police Chief Regulations and Police Chief Decrees governing the structure and operational mechanisms of Propam. Secondary legal materials encompass academic literature, peer-reviewed scientific journals, legal textbooks, and reports from relevant state institutions such as the Indonesian Ombudsman and Komnas HAM. Tertiary legal materials include legal dictionaries, encyclopedias, and various indices that assist in clarifying the legal terminology employed in this study [27].

The technique for collecting legal materials was conducted through systematic and comprehensive library research. The researcher performed identification, inventory, and classification of all relevant legal materials using citation card methods and document analysis. For legislative and regulatory legal materials, the researcher accessed the National Legal Documentation and Information Network (JDIH), the State Gazette, and accredited legal databases. For secondary legal materials, the researcher utilized journal databases including Google Scholar, DOAJ, and nationally reputable law journals [28].

The technique of legal material analysis in this study employs legal interpretation methods encompassing grammatical, systematic, historical, and teleological interpretation. Grammatical interpretation is used to understand the meaning of legal provisions based on the text and language employed. Systematic interpretation involves analyzing legal norms in relation to other norms within a cohesive legal system. Historical interpretation takes into account the background and purpose of a regulation's enactment, while teleological interpretation is oriented toward the objectives that the legal norm seeks to achieve [29]. These four interpretive techniques are applied in an integrated manner to produce a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis.

In addition, the legal material analysis also employs legal construction methods, particularly analogical construction and *argumentum a contrario*, to fill normative gaps (*leemten in het recht*) identified in Propam's regulatory framework. This approach enables the researcher to go beyond merely describing the existing law and to formulate normative recommendations with the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the oversight mechanism of Propam's internal oversight [30]. Maryana, Aspan, and Mandasari [31] employ a similar approach in their juridical analysis of data protection implementation in electronic medical records, yielding constructive recommendations for regulatory reform.

Results

Effectiveness of Propam's Internal Oversight Mechanism in Ensuring Criminal Law Enforcement Accountability Among Polri Members at the North Sumatra Regional Police

Propam, as the internal oversight unit of Polri, possesses a structure and mechanism that is normatively relatively comprehensive. Pursuant to Police Regulation Number 7 of 2022 on Professional Ethics and the Professional Ethics Commission of the Indonesian National Police, Propam holds the authority to conduct preliminary inquiries and investigations into disciplinary violations and professional ethics code violations committed by Polri members [2]. At the Polda Sumut level, the Propam Division (*Bid Propam*) is headed by a Division Chief holding the rank of Senior Commissioner of Police (*Kombes Pol*), who is structurally directly accountable to the Head of the North Sumatra Regional Police (*Kapolda Sumut*). Although this structural framework satisfies formal requirements, it nonetheless contains a fundamental problem pertaining to oversight independence.

Based on the data collected, the Propam Division of Polda Sumut handled at least 312 disciplinary and professional ethics violation cases in 2022, of which 187 were resolved through the internal disciplinary hearing mechanism. These figures appear quantitatively significant; however, an assessment of oversight effectiveness cannot rest on the numerical dimension alone. The quality of case handling, the transparency of the process, and the proportionality of the sanctions imposed constitute far more substantive indicators of effectiveness. The 2023 report of the Indonesian Ombudsman's North Sumatra Representative Office notes that of 47 public complaints concerning Polri members' conduct that were forwarded to the Bid Propam of Polda Sumut, only 12 complaints (approximately 25%) received an adequate written response [4].

One of the fundamental problems in the effectiveness of Propam's oversight is its structurally non-independent position. Unlike autonomous external oversight bodies, Propam operates within the same chain of command as the units it supervises. This situation creates what Bovens [14] terms an "accountability deficit" namely, a situation in which accountability mechanisms formally exist but do not function optimally in substance because they are influenced by institutional loyalty. Siregar [5] unequivocally asserts that independence is an absolute prerequisite for the effectiveness of internal oversight in a police institution, and that without genuine independence, oversight will serve merely as an instrument of legitimation rather than correction.

Transparency constitutes another dimension of oversight effectiveness that warrants serious attention. Polri's Professional Ethics Hearings and Disciplinary Hearings conducted by Propam are closed (non-public) proceedings, meaning that the public and even the victims of violations cannot access information concerning the process or the outcomes of the hearings. This provision for confidentiality is indeed regulated in Polri's technical regulations; however, it conflicts with the principle of transparency that constitutes an integral component of democratic accountability [32]. Rahmayanti, Zarzani, Sukarwoto, and Diriyanti [3], in their study of criminal acts of violence within formal institutional settings, affirm that transparency in the handling of official violations represents a legal imperative that cannot be set aside under the guise of "institutional interest."

The dimension of case processing speed also constitutes a parameter of effectiveness that warrants examination. In several cases identified within the Polda Sumut jurisdiction, the resolution of a single violation case required an average of six to twelve months, far exceeding the ideal timeframe of three months stipulated in Polri's internal standard operating procedures. This delay not only harms victims awaiting justice, but also creates an opening for informal negotiation efforts that may compromise the integrity of the process. Daulay, Zarzani, and Aspan [33], in a different context, remind us that delays in legal processes in any form represent a tangible denial of the right to justice.

From a comparative perspective, the effectiveness of Propam at Polda Sumut yields unsatisfactory results when measured against the police oversight standards prevailing in several democratic countries. At the national level, data from the Propam Division of the National Police Headquarters (Mabes Polri) for 2022–2023 indicate that the rate of prosecution of Polri members through general court mechanisms (as distinct from internal disciplinary proceedings) remains extremely low, at no more than 15% of total serious violation cases reported. This figure falls far below the average for democratic countries that implement effective police oversight models, where formal prosecution rates typically range from 30 to 40 percent [17]. This condition indicates that the internal mechanism functions more as a filter than as a bridge toward genuine legal accountability.

The strengthening of Propam's effectiveness cannot be separated from improvements in the quality of the human resources performing the oversight function. Propam members assigned to Polda Sumut largely lack adequate legal education backgrounds, particularly in the fields of human rights law and law enforcement ethics. This condition affects the quality of case investigations, which frequently rely more on field experience than on standardized

investigative methodology. Pardede, Nurhayati, and Aspan [34], in their study on legal protection for workers, underscore that human resource capacity is a critical factor determining the quality of law enforcement in any context.

Structural and Normative Constraints of Propam and the Reformulation of an Ideal Oversight Mechanism

The constraints faced by Propam in performing its oversight function may be categorized into two broad groups: normative constraints rooted in regulatory weaknesses, and structural constraints stemming from an institutional design that insufficiently supports independence. On the normative dimension, there is ambiguity in the formulation of Propam's authority with regard to violations that carry criminal law implications. Article 12 of Government Regulation Number 2 of 2003 distinguishes pure disciplinary violations from criminal acts; however, the boundary between the two is frequently unclear in practice, giving rise to uncertainty as to whether a given case should be handled internally or referred to the general judicial mechanism [2].

A further normative constraint concerns the appeal mechanism against disciplinary and professional ethics hearing decisions deemed unjust by the sanctioned party as well as by complainants or victims. Unlike the general court system, which provides clearly defined and institutionalized appellate channels, the mechanism for objecting to Polri's internal hearing decisions is highly limited and does not provide equal access for complainants. Fikri, Siregar, and Rafianti [23] affirm that access to effective objection mechanisms constitutes an essential element of the right to justice that must not be neglected in the design of any oversight system.

On the structural dimension, the principal constraint lies in Propam's dependence on Polri's militaristic and hierarchical command structure. Within such an organizational culture, the reporting of violations by fellow members atau yang dikenal sebagai "whistle-blowing" masih menghadapi resistensi yang kuat, baik karena ketakutan akan balasan (reprisal) maupun karena internalisasi nilai solidaritas korps yang mengutamakan loyalitas vertikal. Zarzani, Fitrianto, dan Annisa [35] dalam konteks pembaruan hukum pidana menekankan bahwa reformasi struktural yang mengatasi budaya diam (culture of silence) dalam institusi keamanan merupakan prasyarat yang tidak dapat ditawar bagi efektivitas pengawasan internal.

A further structural constraint is the insufficient effective coordination between Propam and external oversight bodies, such as the National Police Commission (Kompolnas), Komnas HAM, and the Indonesian Ombudsman. Although Kompolnas normatively possesses an oversight function with respect to Polri's performance, in practice Kompolnas' access to case data and information handled by Propam is severely limited. This situation creates fragmentation in the police accountability system that ultimately benefits the institution at the expense of members of the public seeking justice [32]. Mahya and Aspan [36], in a different context, demonstrate that effective institutional coordination is the key to the success of oversight mechanisms in any public institution.

Regarding the reformulation of an ideal oversight mechanism, this study advances several normative recommendations grounded in comparative analysis and Indonesia's contextual needs. First, an institutional reconstruction of Propam toward a semi-independent model is necessary, with the involvement of external elements in its oversight structure. This model may be realized by incorporating elements of civil society, legal academics, and persons of integrity with prior law enforcement experience into the Professional Ethics Commission of the Indonesian National Police (Komisi Kode Etik Profesi Polri), thereby better ensuring the independence of decision-making in disciplinary proceedings [14].

Second, regulatory reform is required to strengthen the transparency and accessibility of Propam's oversight processes. In particular, ethics hearings that concern the interests of victims and the wider public should be open to the public, at minimum by providing access to anonymized summaries of decisions. Rafianti, Zarzani, and Sahlepi [22] emphasize that transparency in oversight does not conflict with legitimate institutional interests, provided that

adequate privacy protection mechanisms are simultaneously applied. This reform must also encompass an obligation for Propam to periodically publish case-handling statistics as a form of public accountability.

Third, more concrete and binding coordination mechanisms between Propam and Kompolnas and Komnas HAM must be formulated, particularly in the handling of serious violation cases involving elements of human rights violations. This integration requires a stronger legal foundation, given that existing regulations do not provide sufficient authority for external bodies to access and monitor Propam's case-handling processes. Siregar and Lubis [8] state that substantive reform of the penal system can only be achieved when supported by a comprehensive oversight ecosystem involving the synergy of internal and external institutions. This institutional synergy model is equally relevant for strengthening accountability in the domain of police oversight.

Fourth, a systematic enhancement of Propam's human resource capacity is needed, encompassing education and training in human rights law, standardized investigative methodology, and police professional ethics grounded in democratic values. Such training programs must not be ad hoc or merely formalistic in nature, but must be integrated into Propam's career development and promotion system. Fatmawati, Fikri, and Siregar [37], in their study of customary and restorative adjudication, demonstrate that official professionalism is the most significant variable in determining the quality of law enforcement, regardless of how well the governing written norms are crafted. Investment in Propam's human resources therefore represents not merely a technical policy, but a strategic choice in building a police institution that is accountable and trusted by the public.

Conclusions

Based on the research findings and discussion presented above, two principal conclusions may be drawn that simultaneously address the research questions of this study. First, Propam's internal oversight mechanism at the North Sumatra Regional Police has not yet achieved optimal effectiveness in ensuring criminal law enforcement accountability among members of Polri. Although normatively the regulatory framework governing Propam is sufficiently comprehensive, its implementation is impeded by structural non-independence, minimal transparency in the professional ethics hearing process, a low rate of formal prosecution in serious cases, and limited coordination with external oversight bodies. This condition reflects a serious disparity between *das sollen* and *das sein* within Polri's institutional accountability mechanism.

The constraints faced by Propam are twofold: normative and structural. Normatively, there is regulatory ambiguity in the determination of Propam's authority over violations with criminal implications, an inadequate appeal mechanism, and weak cross-institutional coordination. Structurally, the militaristic organizational culture, the dominance of corps loyalty, and Propam's position within the internal chain of command constitute fundamental impediments that cannot be overcome solely through revision of regulatory texts. The reformulation of an ideal oversight mechanism requires an institutional reconstruction of Propam toward a semi-independent model, the strengthening of process transparency, the establishment of binding coordination mechanisms with Kompolnas and Komnas HAM, and systematic investment in the development of Propam's human resource capacity grounded in the values of democracy and respect for human rights. These reform measures require a strong legal foundation and consistent political commitment from Polri's leadership and national policymakers.

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